PAST: A large-scale, persistent peer-to-peer storage utility by Peter Druschel & Antony Rowstron
PAST: A large-scale, persistent peer-to-peer storage utility
Peter Druschel
Rice University, Houston, TX 77005, USA
￿
druschel@cs.rice.edu
Antony Rowstron
Microsoft Research, Cambridge, CB2 3NH, UK
antr@microsoft.com
Abstract
This paper sketches the design of PAST, a large-scale,
Internet-based, global storage utility that provides scala-
bility, high availability, persistence and security. PAST
is a peer-to-peer Internet application and is entirely self-
organizing. PAST nodes serve as access points for clients,
participate in the routing of client requests, and contribute
storage to the system. Nodes are not trusted, they may join
the system at any time and may silently leave the system
without warning. Yet, the system is able to provide strong
assurances, efﬁcient storage access, load balancing and
scalability.
Among the most interesting aspects of PAST’s design are
(1) the Pastry location and routing scheme, which reliably
andefﬁcientlyroutes clientrequests amongthe PASTnodes,
has good network locality properties and automatically re-
solves node failures and node additions; (2) the use of ran-
domizationtoensurediversity inthesetofnodesthatstore a
ﬁle’sreplicasandto provideloadbalancing;and(3)theop-
tional use of smartcards, which are held by each PAST user
and issued by a third party called a broker. The smartcards
support a quota system that balances supply and demand of
storage in the system.
1 Introduction
There are currently many projects aimed at construct-
ing peer-to-peer applications and understanding more of
the issues and requirements of such applications and sys-
tems [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Peer-to-peer systems can be charac-
terized as distributed systems in which all nodes have iden-
tical capabilities andresponsibilities andall communication
is symmetric. We are developing PAST, an Internet-based,
peer-to-peer global storage utility, which aims to provide
strongpersistence,highavailability,scalabilityandsecurity.
The PAST system is composed of nodes connected to
the Internet, where each node is capable of initiating and
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routing client requests to insert or retrieve ﬁles. Optionally,
nodes may also contribute storage to the system. The PAST
nodesform a self-organizingoverlaynetwork. Insertedﬁles
are replicated on multiple nodes to ensure persistence and
availability. With high probability, the set of nodes over
which a ﬁle is replicated is diverse in terms of geographic
location, ownership, administration, network connectivity,
rule of law, etc. Additional copies of popular ﬁles may be
cached in any PAST node to balance query load.
A storage utility like PAST is attractive for several rea-
sons. First, it exploits the multitude and diversity (in ge-
ography, ownership, administration, jurisdiction, etc.) of
nodes in the Internet to achieve strong persistence and high
availability. This obviates the need for physical transport
of storage media to protect backup and archival data; like-
wise, it rendersunnecessarythe explicit mirroringof shared
data for high availability and throughput. A global storage
utility also facilitates the sharing of storage and bandwidth,
thus permitting a group of nodes to jointly store or publish
content that exceeds the capacity of any individual node.
While PAST offers persistent storage services, its ac-
cess semantics differ from that of a conventionalﬁlesystem.
Files stored in PAST are associated with a quasi-unique
ﬁleId that is generated at the time of the ﬁle’s insertion into
PAST. Therefore, ﬁles stored in PAST are immutable since
a ﬁle cannot be inserted multiple times with the same ﬁleId.
Files can be shared at the owner’s discretion by distribut-
ing the ﬁleId (potentially anonymously)and, if necessary, a
decryption key. PAST does not support a delete operation.
Instead, the owner of a ﬁle may reclaim the storage associ-
ated with a ﬁle, which does not guarantee that the ﬁle is no
longer available. These weaker semantics avoid agreement
protocols among the nodes storing the ﬁle.
An efﬁcient routing scheme called Pastry [11] ensures
that client requests are reliably routed to the appropriate
nodes. Client requests to retrieve a ﬁle are routed to a node
that is “close in the network”1 to the client that issued the
request, among all live nodes that store the requested ﬁle.
The number of PAST nodes traversed while routing a client
1Network proximity is based on a scalar metric, such as the number of
IP hops, geographic distance, or a combination of these and other factors.request is at most logarithmic in the total number of PAST
nodes in the system under normal operation.
A storage management scheme in PAST ensures that the
global storage utilization in the system can approach 100%,
despite the lack of centralized control and widely differing
ﬁle sizes and storage node capacities [12]. In a decentral-
ized storage system where nodes are not trusted, an addi-
tional mechanism is required that ensures a balance of stor-
age supply and demand. Towards this end, PAST includes
a secure quota system. In simple cases, users are assigned
ﬁxed quotas, or they are allowed to use as much storage
as they contribute. Optionally, organizations called brokers
may trade storage and issue smartcards to users, which con-
trol how much storage must be contributed and/or may be
used. The broker is not directly involved in the operation of
the PAST network, and its knowledge about the system is
limited to the number of smartcards it has circulated, their
quotas and expiration dates.
Anotherissueinpeer-to-peersystems, andparticularlyin
storage and ﬁle-sharing systems, is privacy and anonymity.
A provider of storage space used by others may not want to
risk prosecutionforcontentit stores, and clients insertingor
retrieving ﬁles may not wish to reveal their identity. PAST
clients and storage providers need not trust each other, and
place only limited trust in brokers. In particular, all nodes
trust the brokers to facilitate the operationof a secure PAST
network by balancing storage supply and demand via re-
sponsible use of the quota system. On the other hand, users
need not reveal to brokers (or anyone else) their identity,
the ﬁles they are retrieving, inserting or storing. Each user
holds an initially unlinkable pseudonym [8] in the form of
a public key. The pseudonym is not easily linkable to the
user’s identity, unless the user voluntarily reveals the bind-
ing. If desired, a user may use multiple pseudonyms to ob-
scurethat certainoperationswereinitiatedby thesame user.
To provide stronger levels of anonymity and other proper-
ties such as anti-censorship, additional mechanisms may be
layered on top of PAST [14, 15, 16].
2 PAST design
Some of the key aspects of PAST’s architecture are (1)
the Pastry routing scheme, which routes client requests
in less than
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e steps on average within a self-
organizing, fault tolerant overlay network; (2) the use of
randomization to ensure probabilistic storage load balanc-
ing and diversity of nodes that store replicas of a ﬁle, with-
out the need for centralized control or expensive distributed
agreement protocols; (3) a decentralized storage manage-
ment and caching scheme that balances the storage utiliza-
tion among the nodes as the total utilization of the sys-
tem approaches 100%, and balances query load by caching
copies of popular ﬁles close to interested clients; and, (4)
the optional use of smartcards, which support a quota sys-
tem to control storage supply and demand.
PAST is composed of nodes connected to the Internet.
Eachnodecanactas astoragenodeandaclientaccess point
and is assigned a 128-bit node identiﬁer (nodeId), derived
from a cryptographic hash of the node’s public key. Each
ﬁle that is inserted into PAST is assigned a 160-bit ﬁleId,
correspondingto the cryptographichash of the ﬁle’s textual
name, the owner’s public key and a random salt. Before
a ﬁle is inserted, a ﬁle certiﬁcate is generated, which con-
tains the ﬁleId, its replication factor
k, the salt, the insertion
date and a cryptographic hash of the ﬁle’s content. The ﬁle
certiﬁcate is signed by the ﬁle’s owner.
When a ﬁle is inserted in PAST, Pastry routes the ﬁle to
the
k nodes whose node identiﬁers are numerically closest
to the 128 most signiﬁcant bits of the ﬁle identiﬁer (ﬁleId).
Each of these nodes then stores a copy of the ﬁle. The
replication factor
k depends on the availability and persis-
tencerequirementsofthe ﬁle andmayvarybetweenﬁles. A
lookuprequest fora ﬁle is routedtowards the live node with
a nodeId that is numerically closest to the requested ﬁleId.
This procedure ensures that (1) a ﬁle remains available
as long as one of the
k nodes that store the ﬁle is alive and
reachable via the Internet; (2) with high probability, the set
of nodes that store the ﬁle is diverse in geographic loca-
tion, administration, ownership, network connectivity, rule
of law, etc.; and, (3) the number of ﬁles assigned to each
node is roughly balanced. (1) follows from the properties
of the PAST routing algorithm described in Section 2.2. (2)
and(3)followfromtheuniformlydistributed,quasi-random
identiﬁers assigned to each node and ﬁle.
In the following, we discuss some of the key aspects of
PAST’s design, namely security, routing and content loca-
tion, self-organization,storage management and caching.
2.1 Security
PAST’s security model is based on the following as-
sumptions: (1) It is computationally infeasible to break the
public-key cryptosystem and the cryptographic hash func-
tion used in PAST; (2) while clients, node operators and
node software are not trusted and attackers may control the
behavior of individual PAST nodes, it is assumed that most
nodes in the overlay network are well behaved; and, (3) an
attacker cannot control the behavior of the smartcards.
In the following discussion, we assume the use of smart-
cards. As discussed later in this section, it is possible to
operate a PAST network without smartcards. Each PAST
node and each user of the system hold a smartcard. A
private/public key pair is associated with each card. Each
smartcard’s public key is signed with the smartcard issuer’s
private key for certiﬁcation purposes. The smartcards gen-
erate and verify various certiﬁcates used during insert andreclaim operations and they maintain storage quotas. Next,
we sketch the main security related functions.
Generation of nodeIds A smartcard provides the nodeId
for an associated PAST node. The nodeId is based on a
cryptographic hash of the smartcard’s public key. This as-
signment of nodeIds probabilistically ensures uniform cov-
erage of the space of nodeIds and diversity of nodes with
adjacent nodeIds, in terms of geographic location, network
attachment, ownership, rule of law, etc. Furthermore,nodes
can verify the authenticity of each other’s nodeIds.
Generation of ﬁle certiﬁcates and store receipts The
smartcard of a user wishing to insert a ﬁle into PAST issues
a ﬁle certiﬁcate. The certiﬁcate contains a cryptographic
hash of the ﬁle’s contents (computed by the client node),
the ﬁleId (computed by the smartcard), the replication fac-
tor,the salt, andis signedbythe smartcard. Duringan insert
operation,theﬁle certiﬁcateallowseachstoringnodetover-
ify (1) that the user is authorized to insert the ﬁle into the
system, which preventsclients from exceedingtheir storage
quotas; (2) that the contents of the ﬁle arriving at the stor-
ing node have not been corrupted en route from the client
by faulty or malicious intermediate nodes; and, (3) that the
ﬁleId is authentic, thus defeating denial-of-service attacks
where malicious clients try to exhaust storage at a subset of
PAST nodes by choosing ﬁleIds with nearby values. Each
storage node that has successfully stored a copy of the ﬁle
then issues and returns a store receipt to the client, which
allows the client to verify that
k copies of the ﬁle have been
created on nodes with adjacent nodeIds, which prevents a
malicious node from suppressing the creation of
k diverse
replicas. During a retrieve operation, the ﬁle certiﬁcate is
returned along with the ﬁle, and allows the client to verify
that the contents are authentic.
Generation of reclaim certiﬁcates and receipts Prior to
issuing a reclaim operation, the user’s smartcard generates
a reclaim certiﬁcate. The certiﬁcate contains the ﬁleId, is
signed by the smartcard and is included with the reclaim re-
quest that is routed to the nodes that store the ﬁle. When
processing a reclaim request, the smartcard of a storage
nodeﬁrst veriﬁes that the signature in the reclaim certiﬁcate
matches that in the ﬁle certiﬁcate stored with the ﬁle. This
preventsusers other than the owner of the ﬁle from reclaim-
ing the ﬁle’s storage. If the reclaim operation is accepted,
the smartcard of the storage node generates a reclaim re-
ceipt. The receipt contains the reclaim certiﬁcate and the
amount of storage reclaimed; it is signed by the smartcard
and returned to the client.
Storage quotas The smartcard maintains storage quotas.
Each user’s smartcard is issued with a usage quota, de-
pending on how much storage the client is allowed to use.
When a ﬁle certiﬁcate is issued, an amount correspond-
ing to the ﬁle size times the replication factor is debited
against the quota. When the client presents an appropri-
ate reclaim receipt issued by a storage node, the amount re-
claimed is credited against the client’s quota. This prevents
clients from exceeding the storage quota they have paid for.
A node’s smartcard speciﬁes the amount of storage con-
tributed by the node (possibly zero). Nodes are randomly
audited to see if they can produce ﬁles they are supposed to
store, thus exposing nodes that cheat by offering less stor-
age than indicated by their smartcard.
In the following,we brieﬂy discuss how some of the sys-
tem’s key properties are maintained.
System integrity Several conditions ensure the basic in-
tegrity of a PAST system. Firstly, to maintain approximate
loadbalancingamongstoragenodes,thenodeIdsandﬁleIds
should each be uniformly distributed. The procedure for
generating and verifying nodeIds and ﬁleIds ensures this.
Secondly, there must be a balance between the sum of all
client quotas (potentialdemand)and the total available stor-
age in the system (supply). The brokerensures that balance,
potentially using the monetary price of storage to regulate
supply and demand. Thirdly, individual malicious nodes
mustbeincapableofpersistentlydenyingserviceto aclient.
A randomized routing protocol, described in Section 2.2,
ensures that a retried operation will eventually be routed
around the malicious node.
Persistence File persistence in PAST depends primarily
on three conditions. (1) Unauthorized users are prevented
from reclaiming a ﬁle’s storage, (2) the ﬁle is stored on
k
storage nodes, and (3) there is sufﬁcient diversity in the set
of storage nodes that store a ﬁle. By issuing and requiring
reclaim certiﬁcates, the smartcards ensure condition(1). (2)
is enforced through the use of store receipts and (3) is en-
sured by the quasi-random distribution of nodeIds, which
can’t be biased by an attacker. The choice of a replication
factor
k must takeintoaccountthe expectedrate oftransient
storage node failures to ensure sufﬁcient availability. In the
event of storage node failures that involve loss of the stored
ﬁles, the system automatically restores
k copies of a ﬁle as
part of a failure recovery procedure [12].
Data privacy and integrity Users may use encryption to
protect the privacy of their data, using a cryptosystem of
their choice. Data encryption does not involve the smart-
cards. Data integrity is ensured by means of the ﬁle certiﬁ-
cates issued by the smartcards.
Pseudonymity A user’s smartcard signature is the only
information associating a stored ﬁle or a request with the
responsible user. The association between a smartcard and
the user’s identity is only known to the user, unless the user
voluntarilyreleases this information. Pseudonymityof stor-
age nodesis similarly ensuredbecausethe node’ssmartcard
signature is not linkable to the identity of the node operator.
Moreover,the Pastry routing scheme avoids the widespreaddissemination of information about the mapping between
nodeIds and IP addresses.
Smartcards Next, we brieﬂy reﬂect on the role of smart-
cards and brokers in PAST. The use of smartcards and even
the presence of brokers as trusted third parties are not fun-
damental to PAST’s design. First, smartcards could be re-
placed by secure on-line quota services run by the brokers.
Second, it is possible to run PAST without a third party.
However, given today’s technology, the smartcards/brokers
solve several issues efﬁciently:
(1)Thesmartcards/brokersensuretheintegrityofnodeId
andﬁleIdassignment. Withoutathirdparty,itmoredifﬁcult
and expensive to prevent attackers from choosing, by trial
and error, ﬁleIds or nodeIds that fall between two adjacent
existing PAST nodeIds.
(2) The smartcards maintain storage quotas securely and
efﬁciently. Achieving the same scalability and efﬁciency
with an on-line quota service is difﬁcult. Enforcing quotas
in the absence of a trusted third party would likely require
complex agreement protocols.
(3) The smartcards are a convenient medium through
which a user can obtain necessary credentials to join the
systemin an anonymousfashion. A usercanobtaina smart-
cardwiththedesiredquotafromaretail outletanonymously
in exchange for cash. Obtaining the credentials on-line car-
ries the risk of revealing the user’s identity or leaking sensi-
tive information to third parties.
There are disadvantages to the use of smartcards. First,
clients needto obtaina card andperiodicallyreplaceit (e.g.,
every year) to ensure key freshness. Second, sophisticated,
resource-rich attackers could compromise a smartcard, per-
mitting them to cheat against the storage quota and mount
certain limited denial-of-service attacks until the card is re-
voked or expires.
Finally, there are performance costs due to the limited
processing speed and I/O performance of smartcards. For-
tunately, read operations involve no smartcard operations.
(In fact, read-only users do not need a smartcard). Write
operations require a ﬁle certiﬁcate veriﬁcation and a store
receipt generation, and we expect that a smartcard keeps up
with the speed of a single disk. Larger storage nodes use
multiple smartcards, and very large storage nodes may re-
quire more powerful tamperproof hardware. Professionally
managed storage sites also have the option of contracting
with a broker, thus obviating the need for trusted hardware.
Future Internet technologies like an anonymous trans-
actions and micropayment infrastructure could obviate the
need for smartcards in PAST. For instance, micro-payments
could be used to balance the supply and demand of storage
without quotas, and anonymous transactions could make it
possible for a user to securely and anonymouslyobtain nec-
essary credentials, including nodeIds and ﬁleIds. We plan
to re-evaluate the use of smartcards as alternatives become
available.
It is to be noted that multiple PAST systems can co-exist
in the Internet. In fact, we envision PAST networks run
by many competing brokers, where a client can access ﬁles
in the entire system. Furthermore, it is possible to operate
isolated PAST systems that serve a mutually trusting com-
munity without a broker or smartcards. In these cases, a
virtual private network (VPN) can be used to interconnect
the system’s nodes.
2.2 Pastry
We now brieﬂy describe Pastry, the location and routing
scheme used by PAST. Given a ﬁleId, Pastry routes the as-
sociated message towards the node whose nodeId is numer-
ically closest to the 128 most signiﬁcant bits (msb) of the
ﬁleId, among all live nodes. Given the invariant that a ﬁle is
stored on the
k nodes whose nodeIds are numerically clos-
est to the 128 msbs of the ﬁleId, it follows that a ﬁle can be
located unless all
k nodes have failed simultaneously (i.e.,
within a recovery period).
Pastryishighlyefﬁcient,scalable,faultresilientandself-
organizing. Assuming a PAST network consisting of
N
nodes, Pastry can route to the numerically closest node to
a given ﬁleId in less than
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b is
a conﬁguration parameter with typical value 4). With con-
currentnode failures, eventualdelivery is guaranteedunless
b
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c nodes with adjacent nodeIds fail simultaneously (
l is
a conﬁguration parameter with typical value
3
2).
The tables required in each PAST node have only
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l entries, where each entry maps a nodeId
to the associated node’s IP address. Moreover, after a
node failure or the arrival of a new node, the invariants in
all affected routing tables can be restored by exchanging
O
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) messages among the affected nodes. In the fol-
lowing, we brieﬂy sketch the Pastry routing algorithm.
For the purpose of routing, nodeIds and ﬁleIds are
thought of as a sequence of digits with base
2
b. A node’s
routing table is organized into
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entries each. The
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1 entries at level
n of the routing ta-
ble each refer to a node whose nodeId matches the present
node’s nodeId in the ﬁrst
n digits, but whose
n
+
1 th digit
has one of the
2
b
￿
1 possible values other than the
n
+
1th
digit in the present node’s id. The uniform distribution of
nodeIds ensures an even population of the nodeId space;
thus, only
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e levels are populated in the routing ta-
ble. Each entry in the routing table points to one of poten-
tially many nodes whose nodeIds have the appropriate pre-
ﬁx. Among such nodes, the one closest to the present node,
according to the proximity metric, is chosen in practice.
In addition to the routing table, each node maintains IP
addresses for the nodes in its leaf set, i.e., the set of nodeswith the
l
=
2 numerically closest larger nodeIds, and the
l
=
2
nodes with numerically closest smaller nodeIds, relative to
the present node’s nodeId.
In each routing step, a node normally forwards the mes-
sage to a node whose nodeId shares with the ﬁleId a preﬁx
that is at least one digit (or
b bits) longer than the preﬁx that
the ﬁleId shares with the present node’s id. If no such node
exists, the message is forwarded to a node whose nodeId
shares a preﬁx with the ﬁleId as long as the current node,
butis numericallycloserto theﬁleId thanthe presentnode’s
id. It follows from the deﬁnition of the leaf set that such a
node exists unless
b
l
=
2
c adjacent nodes in the leaf set have
failed simultaneously.
Locality Next, we brieﬂy discuss Pastry’s locality proper-
ties vis-` a-vis the proximity metric. Recall that the entries
in the node routing tables are chosen to refer to a nearby
node, in terms of the proximity metric, with the appropriate
nodeId preﬁx. As a result, in each step a message is routed
toa“nearby”nodewitha longerpreﬁxmatch(byonedigit).
This local heuristic clearly can’t achieve globally shortest
routes,butsimulationshaveshownthat theaveragedistance
traveled by a message, in terms of the proximity metric, is
only 50% higher than the corresponding “distance” of the
source and destination in the underlying network [11].
Moreover,since Pastry repeatedly takes a locally “short”
routingstep, messages havea tendencyto ﬁrst reacha node,
among the
k nodes that store the requested ﬁle, that is near
the client, according to the proximity metric. One experi-
ment shows that among 5 replicated copies of a ﬁle, Pas-
try is able to ﬁnd the “nearest” copy in 76% of all lookups
and it ﬁnds one of the two “nearest” copies in 92% of all
lookups [11].
Node addition and failure A key design issue in Pastry is
how to efﬁciently and dynamically maintain the node state,
i.e., the routing table, leaf set and neighborhoodsets, in the
presence of node failures, node recoveries, and new node
arrivals. The protocol is described and evaluated in [11].
Brieﬂy, an arriving node with the new nodeId
X can ini-
tialize its state by contacting a nearby node
A (according to
the proximity metric) and asking
A to route a special mes-
sage to the existing node
Z with nodeIdnumericallyclosest
to
X.
X then obtains the leaf set from
Z, the neighborhood
set from
A, and the
ith row of the routing table from the
ith node encountered along the route from
A to
Z. One can
show that using this information,
X can correctly initialize
its state and notify interested nodes that need to know of its
arrival, thereby restoring all of Pastry’s invariants.
To handlenodefailures, neighboringnodesin the nodeId
space (which are aware of each other by virtue of being in
each other’s leaf set) periodically exchangekeep-alive mes-
sages. If a node is unresponsive for a period
T, it is pre-
sumed failed. All members of the failed node’s leaf set are
then notiﬁed and they update their leaf sets to restore the
invariant. Since the leaf sets of nodes with adjacent nodeIds
overlap, this update is trivial. A recovering node contacts
the nodes in its last known leaf set, obtains their current
leafssets, updatesitsownleafsetandthennotiﬁesthemem-
bers of its presence. Routing table entries that refer to failed
nodes are repaired lazily; the details are described in [11].
Fault-tolerance The routing scheme as described so far
is deterministic, and thus vulnerable to malicious or failed
nodes along the route that accept messages but do not cor-
rectly forward them. Repeated queries could thus fail each
time, since they are likely to take the same route.
To overcome this problem, the routing is actually ran-
domized. To avoid routing loops, a message must always
be forwarded to a node that shares at least as long a preﬁx
with, but is numericallycloser to the destination node in the
namespace than the current node. The choice among mul-
tiple suitable nodes is random. In practice, the probability
distribution is heavily biased towards the best choice to en-
sure low average route delay. In the event of a malicious
or failed node along the path, the query may have to be re-
peated several times by the client, until a route is chosen
that avoids the bad node.
2.3 Storage management and caching
The statistical assignment of ﬁles to storage nodes in
PAST approximately balances the number of ﬁles stored at
each node. However, non-uniform storage node capacities
andﬁle sizes requiremore explicitstorageload balancingto
permit graceful behavior under high global storage utiliza-
tion; and, non-uniform popularity of ﬁles requires caching
to minimize fetch distance and to balance the query load.
PAST employs a storage management scheme that
achieves high global storage utilization while rejecting few
ﬁle insert requests. The scheme relies only on local coor-
dination among the nodes in a leaf set, and imposes little
overhead. ExperimentalresultsshowthatPAST canachieve
global storage utilization in excess of 95%, while the rate of
rejected ﬁle insertions remains below 5% and failed inser-
tions are heavily biased towards large ﬁles [12].
Any PAST node can cache additional copies of a ﬁle,
which achieves query load balancing, high throughput for
popularﬁles, andreducesfetchdistanceandnetworktrafﬁc.
Storage management and caching are described in [12].
3 Related work
There are currently several peer-to-peer systems in use,
and many more are under development. Among the most
prominent are ﬁle sharing facilities, such as Gnutella [2]
and Freenet [5]. The Napster [1] music exchange service
provided much of the original motivation for peer-to-peer
systems, but it is not a pure peer-to-peer system because itsdatabase is centralized. All three systems are primarily in-
tended for the large-scale sharing of data ﬁles; persistence
and reliable content location are not guaranteed or neces-
sary in this environment.
In comparison, PAST aims at combining the scalabil-
ity and self-organization of systems like FreeNet with the
strong persistence and reliability expected of an archival
storagesystem. Inthis regard,it is morecloselyrelatedwith
projects like OceanStore [7], FarSite [4], FreeHaven [6],
and Eternity [3]. FreeNet, FreeHavenand Eternity are more
focusedonprovidingstronganonymityandanti-censorship.
OceanStore provides a global, transactional, persistent
storage service that supports serializable updates on widely
replicated and nomadic data. In contrast, PAST provides
a simple, lean storage abstraction for persistent, immutable
ﬁles with the intention that more sophisticated storage se-
mantics be built on top of PAST if needed.
FarSite has more traditional ﬁlesystem semantics, while
PAST is more targeted towards global, archival storage.
Farsite uses a distributed directory service to locate con-
tent; this is different from PAST’s Pastry scheme, which
integrates content location and routing.
Pastry, along with Tapestry [17], Chord [13] and
CAN [10], represent a second generation of peer-to-peer
routing and location schemes that were inspired by the pio-
neering work of systems like FreeNet and Gnutella. Unlike
thatearlierwork,theyguaranteea deﬁniteanswertoaquery
in a bounded number of network hops, while retaining the
scalability of FreeNet and the self-organizing properties of
both FreeNet and Gnutella.
Pastry and Tapestry bear some similarity to the work by
Plaxton et al [9]. The approach of routing based on address
preﬁxes, which can be viewed as a generalization of hyper-
cube routing, is common to all three schemes. However,
the Plaxton scheme is not self-organizing and it associates
a “root” node with each ﬁle, which forms a single point
of failure. Pastry and Tapestry differ in their approach to
achieving network locality and to replicating objects, and
Pastry appears to be less complex.
The Chord protocol is closely related to Pastry, but in-
stead of routing based on address preﬁxes, Chord forwards
messages based on numerical difference with the destina-
tion address. Unlike Pastry, Chord makes no explicit effort
to achieve good network locality.
CAN routes messages in a
d-dimensional space, where
each node maintains a routing table with
O
(
d
) entries and
any node can be reached in
O
(
d
N
1
=
d
) routing hops. Unlike
Pastry, the routing table does not grow with the network
size,butthenumberofroutinghopsgrowsfasterthan
l
o
g
N.
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